We introduce uncertainty about farmer characteristics into the moral hazard problem facing a regulator offering agri-environmental contracts. Our model allows for a continuum of farmer compliance costs. For reasonable parameter values the model predicts high levels of cheating and intensive monitoring, contrary to the evidence. We therefore add variation in farmers' propensity to cheat, the regulator's assessment of which has a decisive effect on policy: if farmers are overwhelmingly honest then the regulator reduces monitoring and accepts that some dishonest farmers will escape undetected. Paradoxically, the total number of cheats may increase following an increase in the number of honest farmers.
Introduction
Since the 1980s there has been a trend towards paying farmers for the production of environmental public goods in the countryside. Such policies create 'quasi-markets' in these goods in that farmers enter voluntarily into environmental contracts in return for a payment. Examples include the English Countryside Stewardship Scheme, the German MEKA 1 programme, and the French 'prime à l'herbe'. All these schemes are implemented under the EU Rural Development Regulation, 2 which allows for large increases in agri-environmental expenditure (within England the planned increase, between 2000 and 2006, is 120 per cent). Furthermore, the Luxembourg agreement on reform of the CAP calls for a further redirecting of support from the 'first pillar' to agri-environmental and rural development schemes through 'modulation'.
The design of conservation contracts with farmers is plagued by two types of incentive problem, moral hazard and adverse selection, both of which are caused by an asymmetric distribution of information in the farmer -government relationship (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1998) . The basis of the adverse selection problem in agri-environmental schemes is asymmetric information about individual farmers' compliance costs:
3 farmers differ in their compliance costs, and if these differences could be observed then farmers could be paid their reservation prices for compliance, thus saving money compared with the use of a fixed payment level. Significant progress has been made in the design of policy mechanisms which alleviate the problem (e.g. Fraser, 1995; Smith, 1995; Wu and Babcock, 1996; Van der Hamsvoort, 1997, 1998; Slangen, 1997; Byström and Bromley, 1998; Moxey et al., 1999) , but it remains the norm in European agri-environmental schemes to offer a single, fixed level of payment.
Our focus in this paper is on the moral hazard problem, the basis of which is imperfect information about farmers' actual compliance. Due to this asymmetry, farmers may feel tempted not to honour their conservation contracts. The moral hazard problem is significant in practice, with active monitoring of farmer compliance and significant (although varying) rates of cheating reported. Giannakas and Kaplan (2002) quote US statistics showing that out of 750,000 farmers receiving conservation payments in 1997, 50,000 were audited of whom 2,000 were found to be not actively applying the approved conservation plan; Anjou (personal communication, 2004) has reported a checking rate of approximately 5 per cent for a Swedish scheme (discussed further below), although total reported cheating is low (4 per cent of controlled area). On the other hand, Land Use Consultants (1995) found that, on 24 per cent of sites visited, farmers participating in the Countryside Stewardship Scheme in England were compromising their contracts in some way. Hanf (1993) reported that a third of the farmers participating in a German nature conservation scheme were not fulfilling their contractual obligations.
Moral hazard arises due to imperfect information about compliance, but imperfect information about individual farmers' compliance costs will still affect the solution-farmers with high compliance costs are more likely to cheat, as their payoff to cheating (compliance costs saved) is larger than that of other farmers, whereas the loss on discovery (fixed fine) is likely to be constant. 4 Furthermore, choices will also be affected by farmers'
estimates of the probability of detection as a cheat, and its perceived cost (which depends on the fine, but also, potentially, on their degree of risk aversion and other psychological factors). It is reasonable to suppose-and consistent with observations-that the regulatory solution to such a problem will lead some farmers to participate and cheat, others will participate and comply, whereas a third group will not participate at all. Yet none of the models in the literature of which we are aware have a solution of this nature-indeed, the majority of models allow for a single farmer type, and hence the regulatory solution is one in which all farmers participate and comply. We now discuss some of these models. Models with a single farmer type include Fraser (1998, 1999) , and Ozanne et al. (2001) . Fraser (1998, 1999) developed a model of optimal contract enforcement focusing on the relationship between the accuracy of monitoring and the costs incurred by the environmental agency when implementing policy, demonstrating an explicit trade-off between monitoring costs and incentive payments as a means of ensuring the desired behaviour from the farmer. Ozanne et al. (2001) modelled agri-environmental policy as a social welfare maximisation problem that recognises the trade-off between increased environmental benefits and increased costs of compliance monitoring. The solution to the problem identifies the optimal environmental standard (in terms of input abatement), incentive payment and detection probability (i.e. monitoring effort) for each individual farmer. The solution to the moral hazard problem is characterised as second-best inasmuch as it involves less input abatement than the first-best (perfect information) solution. The effectiveness of the enforcement strategy is measured by the extent to which the second-best solution converges to the first-best solution, and it is shown that this is largely determined by the degree of farmers' risk aversion and the cost structure of the monitoring process.
A model which does allow for different farmer types is that of White (2002) , who extended the model of Moxey et al. (1999) to include uncertainty about both actual compliance and compliance costs. However, the variation across farmers is simple enough that the regulator's solution remains (as in cases with identical farmers) to set the monitoring rates at levels such that all participating farmers comply, i.e. there is never any cheating. This is effectively a corner solution which does not fully reflect the complex regulatory problem of dealing with a range of farmer types.
Our aim in this paper is to produce a model that better reflects the situation actually facing the regulator in a typical agri-environmental scheme. The regulator faces both adverse selection and moral hazard problems, but by offering a flat payment backed up by monitoring he chooses to deal only with moral hazard. 5 We extend the literature by allowing for a continuum of farmers with differing compliance costs, about which the regulator has only limited information. Information about actual compliance can only be gained at a cost; monitoring costs increase linearly in the monitoring probability. Hence farmers who are found to be cheating lose their payment, and may also suffer an additional fine. However, the size of this fine is small relative to the payment, as observed in practice (Swierzbinski, 1994; Choe and Fraser, 1999) . A given farmer has an incentive to cheat if the expected pay-off to cheating is greater than the (known) pay-offs to the alternatives, i.e. compliance or non-participation. The regulator can affect these pay-offs via both the payment and the probability of monitoring. The regulator has a pre-determined environmental target, and minimises total budgetary costs.
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We begin by developing a simple model in which all farmers are profit maximisers (i.e. risk neutral). The regulator knows the distribution of compliance costs across all farms, but has no information about the costs of individual farmers. An immediate consequence of this set-up is that farmers whose compliance costs are higher than the payment level may nevertheless choose to participate in the programme with the express intention of cheating. Given that they cheat, their high compliance costs do not deter them from participating. A second consequence, given that any fines are constrained to be low, is that compliance can only be enforced through high levels of monitoring. Hence it is likely that the cheapest way to achieve a given environmental target is a corner solution with a relatively low payment, but high probability of monitoring, leading to zero cheating. This result does not conform with observations of relatively low levels of monitoring, and low levels of cheating (Anjou, personal communication, 2004) .
We therefore move on to develop a more complex model where only a proportion of farmers are pure profit maximisers, and therefore consider cheating. The remainder are characterised as honest, and never consider the option of cheating.
7 Equilibria with low levels of both monitoring and cheating are comprehensible within this model, even when fines are constrained to be low.
The rest of the paper is organised in four sections. In Section 2 we present and solve the simple model and discuss its shortcomings. In Section 3 we discuss and solve the extended model where farmers vary in honesty as well as compliance costs, and analyse the solution. In Section 4 we present a critical discussion of the results, and possible extensions. Section 5 concludes.
6 We argue that this is a more realistic problem specification than social welfare maximisation, which requires the regulator to have perfect knowledge of the value of the environmental enhancement function. In this we follow Hanf (1993) and Fraser (1998, 1999) , as well as being supported by Bose (1995) , who argued that cost-effectiveness is often an important consideration for budget-constrained regulators. It may of course be argued that the choice of constraint is itself the result of an implicit social welfare maximization. 7 All farmers are of course utility maximisers, but their utility functions differ. The dichotomy can be interpreted in various ways, as discussed further in Section 2.
The simple model, limitations and extensions
In this section we begin by presenting and solving the simple model, before discussing its limitations and possible extensions through which the limitations may be overcome. Consider a regulator who wishes to sign contracts with farmers involving a payment G to the farmer in return for the farmer agreeing to conservation measures involving changes to or limits on aspects of farming technology. These may include an upper limit on fertiliser or pesticide usage, a stocking-rate limitation, a provision to leave field margins uncultivated, or payments for the maintenance of extensive grazing land. The agreement is identical for all farmers, even though the characteristics of farms vary.
Farmers aim to maximise their expected profits, and their options are non-participation, to participate and comply, or to participate and cheat. Cheating is assumed to be all-or-nothing, i.e. farmers who cheat use their original unmodified profit-maximising agricultural technology. The characteristics of the farmers vary in one dimension: implementation cost. There is a continuum of farmers f i , where i [ (0,1). Farmer f i has implementation cost w i , where w i ¼ iW. Farmers are spread with constant density: thus, defining z(i) as the probability that a given farmer has costs w i then
The regulator's environmental target implies that a given proportion of farmers, M, must participate in and comply with the scheme; henceforth M is called the compliance constraint. The compliance constraint should be satisfied at least cost to the taxpayer, and costs flow from the payments, level G, to participating farmers, plus monitoring costs, which are equal to k per farmer monitored. In case of detection, the regulator extracts payment dG, where d $ 1, which flows back into the regulator's budget. Thus the regulator chooses the levels of the payment G and the probability of detection p which minimise total costs while fulfilling the compliance constraint M. Note that G is constrained to be constant for all farmers, whereas p may vary between farmers if the regulator possesses (or can obtain) information about individual farmer characteristics that affect their propensity to cheat. Parameters d and k are exogenous.
The expected payoffs p i to farmer i are then as follows. Participate and cheat: p i ¼ Gð1 2 dpÞ. Participate and comply: p i ¼ G 2 iW. Do not participate: p i ¼ 0. The solution can be described as follows.
(1) Cheat if the pay-off is both positive and greater than the pay-off to compliance:
(2) Comply if the pay-off is both positive and greater than or equal to the pay-off to cheating:
(3) Do not participate if neither the pay-off to cheating nor the pay-off to compliance is positive.
Assume that the regulator has no information about the costs of individual farmers, hence p must be equal for all participating farmers. An interesting property that then emerges is that if it is worth while for any farmer to participate and cheat, then dp , 1 (from equation (1)), and all farmers for whom equation (2) holds will participate and cheat. For the other farmers, equations (3) and (4) hold, hence they participate and comply. Thus, if any farmer cheats, this implies that all farmers participate in the scheme. From equations (2) and (4) we know that Gdp/W farmers comply, and 1 2 Gdp/W farmers cheat. We can use this information to set up the regulator's optimisation problem as a Lagrangian:
Costs are equal to the number of compliers £ the payment to them, plus the number of cheats £ the expected payment to them, plus control costs per farmer £ the probability of control £ the number of participants (unity). The first-order conditions in p and G give directly the arbitrage condition
This states that the payment level G must be equal to the control cost kp. It holds up to the point where we have a corner solution with zero cheating, i.e. where dp $ 1 and cheating involves an expected loss. The solution to the problem is where this condition meets the compliance constraint
Finally, account must be taken of the no-cheating limit, dp ¼ 1: At this limit there is no cheating, and thus neither the arbitrage equation nor the compliance constraint apply beyond this point.
The results are shown in Figure 1 , which is plotted with parameter values M ¼ 0:3; k ¼ 0:5; W ¼ 1; and d ¼ 1:1: Thus the maximum fine is low (the sanction on detection amounts to the loss of payment plus a small additional fine), and checking costs are high (the cost of a single control is the same as the median farmer's compliance cost). The result is a solution with a very high checking rate of 74 per cent, and a very high level of cheating; 70 per cent of farmers choose to participate and cheat. The main effect of the model innovation, the introduction of a range of farmer types, is thus that optimal solutions are possible where some, indeed many, farmers participate and cheat. Some of these cheaters actually have compliance costs above the payment level! Furthermore, the model shows that, for reasonable parameter values, a very high checking probability should be chosen by the regulator.
The comparative statics of the model are very simple; we analyse them intuitively with reference to Figure 1 . A decrease in control costs k leads to a rotation of the arbitrage line clockwise about the origin, hence the payment falls and the detection probability rises. A corner solution may result with no cheating. Decreases in M or W (the compliance constraint and compliance costs) shift the compliance constraint towards the origin, thus leading to lower payments and lower checking probability. An increase in the fine d has a similar effect, but the no-cheating limit also moves leftwards, making a corner solution with no cheating more likely. Finally, note that if all farmers were assumed equally risk averse this would have a similar effect to a rise in d.
We argue that the above results are not in accordance with observations, where a combination of low fines, low rates of checking, and relatively little cheating seems to be the norm. Good data are hard to come by, and we support our case with unpublished data concerning payments for maintenance of semi-natural grazing land in Sweden, all of which come from personal communication from Anna Anjou at Uppsala County Council (2004). The fines applied are calculated according to a scale that depends on the seriousness of the non-compliance, the most serious case being where more than 50 per cent of the total area for which payments have been made is found to be in breach of the conditions. In this case no payment is made for that year, and in some circumstances there may be a demand for repayment from previous years. Thus, even when the degree of non-compliance is very high, the most likely sanction is the withdrawal of payment for the given year, in extreme cases extending to withdrawal of earlier payments. However, it should be noted that there is in addition a potential threat of police action in case of obvious fraud.
The checking rate in Uppsala region is about 5 per cent per year, and in Sweden as a whole 1,800 out of 32,300 farmers were checked in 2003, i.e. 5.6 per cent. At this rate, farmers' net loss of utility following checking must be about 20 times greater than the utility gain from the payment if participation without compliance (cheating) is not to be an attractive option. Yet in practice the net loss is likely to be zero (i.e. withdrawal of payment) except in exceptional cases. Nevertheless, rates of cheating are low: of the 1,800 farmers mentioned above, 31 per cent had some degree of non-compliance, but the area of non-compliant land was just 4 per cent of the total area checked. Finally, the cost of checking a single farmer is estimated at 10,000 Swedish crowns (approximately e1100), about 20 per cent of a typical payment. Given these parameters, a corner solution with high checking rates and no cheating seems inevitable given a model set-up as above.
The obvious extension to the model is to assume that farmers are risk averse, and therefore avoid cheating because of its concomitant uncertain outcome. However, we argue that currently available evidence does not support risk aversion as the explanation, and that a simpler explanation exists that is equally congruent with the evidence. This simpler explanation is that a large proportion of farmers simply do not consider cheating as an option, irrespective of the objectively observable checking probability or penalties following discovery. We call these farmers 'honest', whereas the remainder are assumed to be pure profit maximisers. For simplicity we label the latter farmers, amoral calculators, as 'dishonest'.
Risk aversion may be preferred as an explanation for apparently honest behaviour as it may be measurable and hence less arbitrary. Although risk aversion at the farm level is likely to be unobservable to the regulator, it may be argued that at least the distribution of risk aversion over the farmer population can be measured, and thus the model parameterisation can be empirically grounded. However, we question this possibility as well, as much recent work (see, for instance, Just and Pope, 2003) highlights the difficulty of measuring farmers' risk preferences in practice, because of the difficulty of accurately specifying models and disentangling multiple effects. Furthermore, the behaviour of risk-averse farmers may not be identical to the honest farmers in the model. Firstly, when the maximum fine is low then very high degrees of risk aversion are required. 9 Furthermore, in practice the maximum possible fine is often zero, and in such cases risk aversion will not deter rationally calculating farmers whose compliance costs are in any case above the payment level.
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So how can 'honest' behaviour be explained within the model? Apart from the obvious possibility of assuming that some farmers experience a very high cost (in terms of utility) to cheating, there is also the possibility that farmers' subjective evaluation of small risks (such as the risk of being monitored) may be far from the true risk, as argued by Buschena (2003) . Buschena argues that at low levels of risk the subjective estimate of risk may be much higher than the true risk, and almost invariant in the level of the true risk. Thus, farmers might overweight low probabilities of detection, thus making changes in monitoring rate an ineffective instrument for these farmers. Furthermore, farmers may overweight the probability of receiving a large fine or jail term on detection, a probability which may in practice be zero or very close to zero. Attempts to model the behaviour of such farmers as the result of rational calculations based on observable probabilities will lead to inaccurate predictions, whereas modelling based on the assumption that they always avoid cheating may be more realistic. In the light of the above arguments, our assumption of honest and dishonest farmers seems no less arbitrary than the alternatives, and has the benefit of simplicity. 
The extended model
In the extended model, the regulator's goal remains the same, i.e. cost-minimisation given the restriction on compliance. However, we make two extensions to the model. Firstly, in a minor extension, we assume that the regulator may have some information about farm costs. Secondly, as discussed above, we relax the assumption that all farmers are pure profit maximisers.
Concerning the first extension, we assume that the regulator can distinguish a proportion 1 2 q of farms as obviously high-cost and hence not realistic candidates for payment, hence such farms would automatically be monitored if they were to participate.
12 That is, farmers whose compliance cost w i is greater than q/W are known to the regulator and can be ruled out from participation-the only reason they would participate would be in order to cheat. As long as this proportion is exogenously given, the existence of the known high-cost farms has no effect, and they could easily be assumed away; an interesting extension would be to endogenise this parameter. In such an extended model, the regulator would have the option to collect more information about farmers' compliance costs, hence reducing monitoring costs and/or the payment level. Secondly, we assume that a proportion of farmers h does not consider cheating under any circumstances, whereas the remainder are pure profit maximisers. Thus we have a range of farmers f ij ; where i; j [ ð0; 1Þ: Farmer f ij has implementation cost w i , where w i ¼ iW; and is honest if j # h, dishonest if j . h. Honest farmers maximise their expected profits p i,j subject to the restriction that they never cheat, whereas dishonest farmers maximise their expected payoffs. Farmers are spread with constant density in both dimensions, so in addition to Ð i 0 zðiÞdi ¼ i; a fraction h of farmers is honest (h is exogenous). Honesty and compliance costs are assumed uncorrelated. Hence, farmers can be represented as spread with constant density over a unit square, as shown in Figure 2a . The horizontal position reveals whether a farmer is honest or dishonest, and the vertical position reveals the farmer's compliance cost. The regulator cannot tell whether an individual farmer is honest or dishonest, but is assumed to know the distribution of h.
Consider now Figure 2b , divided horizontally into three sections. The top group of farmers (the high-cost farmers) are ruled out of the reckoning by the regulator. The bottom group are those whom the regulator would like to participate, but unfortunately he is unable to distinguish them a priori from the middle group. This imperfect information about costs, combined with the cost of monitoring, is at the heart of the paper.
We now discuss the characteristics of the solution, before going on to derive the conditions. The farmers' conditions remain as in equations (1) -(4). The no-cheating corner solution remains possible, where dp ¼ 1; and hence G=W ¼ M: However, a new corner solution is also possible, where there is no checking and the regulator relies on the honest farmers to achieve the compliance constraint: all dishonest farmers participate and cheat. The level of payment must then be raised from MW to MW/h in order to satisfy the constraint. Finally, there is the non-corner solution where honest farmers are divided into compliers and non-participants, and dishonest farmers are divided into compliers and cheaters (they all participate). A fraction G/W of honest farmers comply, and a fraction Gdp/W of dishonest farmers comply, and hence the compliance constraint is
All these cases are illustrated in Figure 3 . In Figure 3c , E(F) is the expected fine on cheating, i.e. pGd. All honest farmers with compliance costs under G contract and comply. Of the dishonest farmers, only those with costs under the expected fine on cheating choose to comply. The remainder cheat (apart from those whose costs are known by the regulator to be above q). The regulator's problem can be set up mathematically as a cost-minimisation under the restriction on total number of complying farmers. By reference to Figure 3c , the problem is Costs are equal to the number of honest participants £ the payment to them, plus the number of dishonest compliers £ the payment to them, plus the number of dishonest cheats £ the expected payment to them, plus control costs per farmer £ the probability of control £ the number of participants.
Simplifying and taking first-order conditions in p and G gives, on elimination of l, the arbitrage equation
Equation (10) must be satisfied for a cost-efficient solution (at any other points we could reduce costs holding total compliance constant by switching between G and p). Together with equation (8) (the restriction on total compliance) we thus have a unique solution for the optimal values of G and p, as shown in Figure 4 (where the no-cheating limit p ¼ 1=d is also shown). Figure 4 is constructed using parameter values M ¼ 0:3; h ¼ 0:825; q ¼ 0:6; d ¼ 1:1; and k ¼ 0:2: Note that we assume a high proportion of honest farmers (82.5 per cent), and a fairly high required uptake-half of the farmers in the 'zone of uncertainty' must be encouraged to comply. The fine on discovery is low (only 10 per cent of the original payment), and monitoring costs are quite high. It turns out that G ¼ 0:35 and p ¼ 0:28; so 28 per cent of participants are checked in the optimum. Then pGd ¼ 0:11; so of the dishonest farmers, only those with W # 0.11 will comply in the scheme. The remainder below q will contract, but cheat. This amounts to over 20 per cent of participants in the scheme.
We now go on to discuss comparative statics. The main comparative static results for non-corner solutions can be seen directly from consideration of the arbitrage and total compliance equations (10) and (8). Some of the effects are ambiguous, and the mathematical conditions are easily derived. We leave this to the reader, focusing here on an intuitive discussion of the more clear-cut results.
An increase in M (the compliance constraint) shifts the total compliance restriction upwards, leading to an increase in both the optimal payment level and checking probability, as intuition would also have it.
An increase in k (the cost of monitoring) shifts the arbitrage curve to the left, leading to an increase in payments and a decrease in checking. Thus, a rise in monitoring costs leads to a shift in emphasis from ensuring compliance of dishonest farmers towards ensuring participation of honest farmers.
An increase in h (the proportion of honest farmers) shifts the total compliance curve downwards, while (at least under normal circumstances) shifting the arbitrage curve upwards. The result is a fall in the checking rate, whereas the effect on the payment level is uncertain. If there are more honest farmers, it is less worth while to perform monitoring, which must be spread over all participating farmers. The reduction in checking means that, ceteris paribus, a higher proportion of the remaining dishonest farmers choose to cheat. Indeed, it is possible that, paradoxically, the total number of cheats goes up at the optimum following an increase in the number of honest farmers. In that case, a rise in the payment level is also required.
Finally, a rise in q (corresponding to less information about high-cost farmers) leads to the arbitrage curve shifting down, so the probability of checking increases and the payment level falls. Thus when the regulator has less information about farmers' costs, he is forced to do more checking to keep a lid on cheating. A side-effect is that he is able to reduce the payment level.
Discussion
We begin this section by discussing the implications of our results, before going on to further possible extensions.
Most of the results from the model are intuitively plausible; for instance, that an increase in the total compliance target leads to an increase in both the optimal payment level and checking probability, and that an increase in the cost of monitoring leads to an increase in payments but a decrease in checking, i.e. a shift in emphasis from ensuring compliance of dishonest farmers towards raising total participation. We focus here on two less obvious results: firstly, the effect of a change in the proportion of honest farmers; secondly, the effect of a change in information about farmers' costs.
The regulator's assessment of farmers' honesty has a decisive effect on policy. If farmers are thought to be unlikely to cheat despite positive expected returns, then the optimal strategy is likely to be one with a relatively high payment, but little or no monitoring. If the opposite applies, then very stringent monitoring may be called for in an optimal solution. In the first case, more cheating may actually take place than in the second, but the regulator chooses to ignore the small proportion of dishonest farmers, as they are too hard to find.
Information about which individual farmers have high compliance costs is valuable to a regulator, even when he deals only with moral hazard. The reason is that increases in such information (increases in q) mean that potential cheaters are removed from the equation and hence the regulator chooses a lower rate of monitoring and higher payment level, reducing total costs. A trivial conclusion in practice is that the regulator should use information about high-cost farms, if it is available, to direct monitoring towards these farms if they participate. Furthermore, we can go beyond the model to conclude that it may be a cost-effective strategy for the regulator to improve his information about the compliance costs of individual farmers, as we show in principle that such information has a value to the regulator. An investigation of such a strategy would of course require an extended model including the costs of such information-gathering.
Concerning further possible extensions to the model, we first discuss the observation that farmers are more likely to cheat at the margin rather than engage in blatant cheating (total non-compliance), and link this to the problem of adverse selection. We go on to discuss extensions to a dynamic context.
Our model allows farmers to vary in their compliance costs, and in their willingness to cheat: a proportion of farmers are assumed unwilling to engage in blatant cheating where they accept payments but do not adjust their land management. If such farmers make up a large majority, then the model suggests a corner solution with no checking.
13 But Anjou (personal communication, 2004) argues that no farmers apply for support payments with the intention of cheating. This could be taken to imply that all farmers are 'honest', and there is no need for checking. However, it also suggests an extension to the model where a small proportion of farmers (perhaps none) are prepared to consider blatant cheating, but the remainder will cheat marginally if it suits them. By 'marginal' cheating, we mean that they do not fulfil the contract conditions to the letter. This fits the Swedish data even better than our model can, in that of the 1,800 controlled farmers mentioned above, 31 per cent failed to fulfil the contract conditions to the extent that sanctions were taken, but this corresponded to just 4 per cent of the total area.
If farmers cheat only at the margin, then the control problem becomes very different. Firstly, even farmers who cheat will contribute significantly to the fulfilment of the environmental target. A tightening of controls may deter such farmers from participation and hence lead to a reduction in area of land area in compliance. Secondly, farmers with high compliance costs will be deterred from participation, as participation and cheating will also involve high costs for these farmers. Thus, high-cost farmers will rule themselves out, without the need for information on the part of the regulator. In such a model it could be that some degree of cheating is actually beneficial in the sense that high-cost farmers, in order to equalise marginal costs and marginal benefits, should be given less stringent management prescriptions. As these farmers are not known to the regulator, it is not possible to offer such contracts. However, they may self-select by signing up to stringent contracts but then only complying partially. This implies that tolerating partial non-compliance could be a means of correcting a 'policy failure' arising from the offering of homogeneous contracts.
Alternatively, the model could be extended to deal explicitly with the adverse selection problem, perhaps through an auction scheme as frequently used in the USA (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997). In such a scheme, farmers' bids would reveal information about their costs, and hence might also allow the regulator to target monitoring effort more effectively. Alternatively, farmers may-as in the British 'Environmentally Sensitive Area Scheme'-be offered different types of contract varying in payment level and conditions. Monitoring levels could then be varied depending on which contract the given farmer has signed.
One obvious limitation of the model is that it is limited to a single period. Given multiple periods, the regulator has the opportunity to learn the characteristics of farmers, and adjust behaviour accordingly. Unless farmers are myopic, this will also affect their optimal choices. A dynamic strategy for the regulator could be to refuse future participation to farmers who have been found to be cheating. This would increase the loss to farmers on detection, at least those farmers with positive benefits to compliance.
14 Alternatively, through random checking the regulator may learn more about the characteristics of different farms, and hence their compliance costs. This will also allow the regulator to improve targeting of checking effort in the future.
A more speculative innovation would be to introduce the idea that regulatory policy might influence, over time, the farmer's honesty. Consider farmers as 'political citizens' in that decisions to renege on conservation agreements are made with reference to the social norms and behaviour of the farming community. If, for example, it is common knowledge that a large number of farmers (or a few 'leaders') compromise their conservation agreements, the general propensity among farmers to violate their contracts is likely to increase, and vice versa. Social norms could be incorporated into the model as a utility cost to non-compliance. The utility cost would be a decreasing function of the proportion of farmers who violated their conservation contracts in the previous year. Such a formulation would capture the fact that more utility will be lost, in terms of reputation, the more out of step a farmer is with his peers. The likely effect of this change would be that a regulator would do more checking, rather than simply relying on the (large proportion of) honest farmers. The reason is that by deliberately allowing some farmers to 'get away with it' the regulator also allows the social norms to change and other farmers, previously 'honest', may also start to cheat.
Conclusion
The models of this paper show that there is still some way to go in explaining farmers' participation in and compliance with conservation contracts. We argue that existing models are unsatisfactory as they do not account sufficiently for variations in farmer costs. Our own model does allow for such variations, and thus extends the literature in a useful direction. However, the analysis runs up against further difficulties. We believe that models are needed where farmers with different compliance costs decide between nonparticipation, total compliance, and partial compliance. The model of this paper gives a framework within which this could be done. However, the conclusions derived from our extended model rest upon the honesty/dishonesty dichotomy introduced in Section 3, which attracted much criticism in the review process. Some empirical research is called for to examine whether this characterisation of farmers is a reasonable reflection of reality. This may not be an easy task, as departures from expected utility maximisation-for which moral scruples may be one reason-are intrinsically difficult to identify from empirical data (see Buschena, 2003) . Tailor-made economic experiments, designed such that subjects' choices reveal their attitudes towards cheating in the context of agri-environmental contracting, may be one way forward.
